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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

REPORTS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PLANS TO ATTACK INDIA

From 100,000 to 200,000 of Wang Chen's (1) [numbers in parentheses refer to appended characters], troops in Sinkiang are concentrated at points such as Lo-p'u (2), Ho-t'ien (3), Mo-yu (4), P'i-shan (5), Yeh-ch'eng (6), So-ch'ie (7), and Su-lo (8), with regimental headquarters at Su-lo. These cities all are situated on the slope of the Karakoram Mountains and comprise the route which Genghis Khan followed on his historical military expedition to India. The Chinese Communist troops presently disposed along this route are excellently equipped and can easily get supplies from the USSR in the case of an emergency. In quality and quantity they far exceed the force needed to eliminate the guerrilla forces at A-erh-chin-shan (9). Moreover, Communist China is not unaware

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that guerrillas in southern Sinkiang have no plans to expand operations before Taiwan troops launch a counteroffensive on the mainland. Therefore, guerrilla suppression can be only a secondary motive for the heavy concentration of troops in southwest Sinkiang. The preparation for a Southeast Asia invasion is their primary motive.

Several facts explain why Communist China will not attack India from Tibet. First, the Tibetan plateau poses difficulties in the transportation of troops and supplies. Second, the long-established communication between Tibetans and Indians facilitates the leakage of military secrets. An alerted India would then align herself with the free world. Third, the Chinese Communists have limited their troops in Tibet to gain the confidence of the people and to effect a "peaceful liberation."

On the other hand, Sinkiang is the ideal place from which to launch an attack on India. The blocking of Hsing-hsing-hsia (10) would stop the leakage of intelligence from that area. The Kunlun Mountains would prevent any detection of the disposition of Communist troops in Sinkiang.

Two other facts lend credence to Communist China's intention to attack India from Sinkiang:

1. Wang Chen, commander-in-chief of the Sinkiang Military District, in speeches delivered in Yen-ch'i (11), K'u-ch'e (12), and A-k'o-su (13), reiterated a statement to the effect that the death blow to the US and Britain will come when the "people" gain virtual control of Southeast Asia resources and that the route to Thailand and Malaya is essentially through India.
2. The Chinese Communists are surveying the Karakoram Mountain routes regularly. They interrogate the natives, advertise widely for persons familiar with the old routes, and pay handsomely for pertinent information.

CHARACTERS

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|--------|------------|
| 1. 王 震 | 8. 疏 勒 |
| 2. 治 浦 | 9. 阿 爾 金 山 |
| 3. 和 闐 | 10. 星 星 峽 |
| 4. 墨 玉 | 11. 焉 耆 |
| 5. 皮 山 | 12. 庫 車 |
| 6. 葉 城 | 13. 阿 克 蘇 |
| 7. 莎 車 | |

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